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International Market Segmentation and Eurodebt Issues
STAVROS B. THOMADAKIS
Depanmeni of Economics and Futance. Barxich Coitege. CUNY. 1070 Lexington Avenue. New }brk. NY JOOW
NILUFER USMEN
Deparoneni of Finance/Economics, fbculzy ofManagemera. Rutgers Univenity. 92 New Street, Newark, NJ 07/02

Abstract. Implications of capital market segmentabon for international capital structure (ICS)—capital structure
consisltng of equity issued in one country and debt issued in another—are examined. Necessary conditions for
the encrxencc of ICS are analyzed under two options for debt issues (roreign debt and Eurodebt) and comparisons
are made. It is shown that in cases where the project cannot support an ICS including foreign debt Eurobonds
can be issued and would be profitable.
Key words: capital market segmentation, internalional capital structure, Eurobond issues

1. Introduction
The emergence of globalized markets in the financial and nonfinancial areas of economic
activities has brought into sharper focus the issue of capital market integration. Whereas
globalization can be understood as the increased opportunity of economic agents to bypass
national frontiers in economic transactions, integration has a more narrow meaning and
is judged by more stringent criteria. In capital markets, for example, we would take globalization to mean that an increasing volume of purchases of financial claims transcends the boundaries of national economies. Yet, international capital markets can be called perfectly integrated only when every possible claim, or contingent claim, is priced identically
everywhere, irrespective of currency or other institutional differences across nations. Thus,
whereas a test for globalization would simply be that the volume of international claim
holdings has bypassed a certain threshold ratio as compared to national claim holdings,
a test for capital market integration would involve a finding of strict adherence to the law
of one price in securities markets. However, the latter is not a necessary condition for
globalization.
Several empirical studies of international capital markets have found evidence of partial
segmentation in the strict sense of price divergences between equivalent financial claims
in various markets.' These divergences are most probably related to lingering investment
restrictions, differential national investor preferences, or other institutional Actors which
differentiate supply or demand for securities across national markets, and which prevent
the enforcement of instantaneous arbitrage-fTee conditions. The findings, which indicate
that a degree of segmentation persists in international capital markets, legitimize and enable
an inquiry into the implications of segmentation for corporate financial decisions.
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More specifically, one important line of inquiry concerns conditions for the emergence
of an international capital structure (ICS), i.e., a funding structure which draws capital
from sources across national markets. In perfect and perfectly integrated capital markets
such a structure would be irrelevant to the wealth of project owners. In imperfectly integrated capital markets however, it will not be irrelevant. The more interesting, and empirically more prevalent, form of ICS occurs when a project in country B is owned by
shareholders in country A and obtains external financing by issue of debt securities in country
B. The requisite capital structure of foreign equity and local debt has received limited study.
In a previous paper (Thomadakis and Usmen 1991) a simple theoretical framework of international capital market segmentation was used to derive necessary conditions for the appearance of an ICS as described above. The basic conclusions reached in that analysis were:
1. Segmentation can be severe or mild, depending on whether the condition of uncovered
interest rate parity (UIRP) is violated or not. If UIRP is violated there is a prima fiicie
case for issuing riskless debt in the market where it is more highly valued.
2. If UIRP is not violated, there may still be an opportunity for higher value of risky debt
in one market over the other. In this case, it is the defeult option which gives rise to
the differential valuation in two mildly segmented markets.
3. In the context of international capital market segmentation, however, it is not sufficient
that debt securities (riskless or risky) be more highly valued in one market over the
other. For an ICS to emerge, equity must be more highly valued in the other market,
i.e., each type of security must be more highly valued in a different market.
4. The last condition places restrictions on the cash flow characteristics of projects which
can support an ICS. Although these are generally complex, they become simple in a
world of risk-neutral investors: high correlation of project cash fiows with the exchange
rate discourages an international capital structure because it tends to create a condition
whereby both debt and equity are more valuable in the same market. For them to be
more valuable in different markets, project cash flows must be such as to have a statedependent relation to the exchange rate, being for instance positively correlated over
some states, and negatively correlated over other states.
These findings, it was argued in the earlier paper, offer a logical foundation for the emergence
of international capital structtires and provide justification for corporate policies which seek
different forms of finance in d i ^ r e n t countries.
An important aspect of debt policy which has not been considered until now is that currency denomination choice can be available in a financing policy, along with the national
market choice for issue of debt securities. For example in a two-country model, and assuming
that equity is held by country A investors, it is possible to issue debt in country B, but
to denominate it in either B currency or A currency. The earlier study mentioned analyzed
the conditions under the first option, i.e., under the restricted choice where issues of debt
in country B have to also be denominated in the currency of country B. In this paper, we
broaden the scope of the analysis by assuming that the se(x>nd option is also available, i.e.,
that debt security issues in country B can also be denominated in A currency. Needless
to say, the issue of debt of that type corresponds to Eurobond-type financing, and the frequent inclusion of Eurobond issues in corporate financing packages makes the question
we wish to investigate empirically relevant.*^
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The analytical lack pursued in this paper builds on previous work. Thus, after introducing concepts and measures of international capital market segmentation in section 2. we
proceed to present the conditions for an ICS in section 3 and then construct a case for
Eurobond financing in section 4. This is done by taking as a starting point a project available
in country B which could not support an ICS when only debt denominated in B currency
(foreign debt) is allowed. We seek conditions under which an ICS can be supported by
such a project, if Eurobond-type debt is allowed instead. The purpose of the analysis is
then clear; to extend and generalize the conditions for emergence of international capital
structures when international debt is allowed to be denominated in different currencies.
Section 5 examines a case of strong segmentation and the implication for choice of denomination of default-firee debt. Section 6 summarizes our conclusions.

2. I n t ^ r a t i o n and segmentation: Concepts and definitions

A simple state-preference framework lends itself to very clear expositions of international
integration or segmentation in a two-country model, with two time periods. We assume
that uncertainty is described by an exhaustive listing of states of the world, which is identical in the two countries. Since we wish to concentrate on issues of integration or segmentation across national markets, this is the only imperfection which will be allowed. Accordingly, it is assumed that internal security markets in countries A and B are perfect and
complete. Prices of pure securities are denominated in the respective currencies and are
defined as

Us) = n,aAs)

and fgis) = n,aB(s)

(1)

where A, B denote the two countries; s is an indieator of the state of the world; and 11,
are homogeneously believed state probabilities. The magnitudes aj(s) are the usual riskadjusting factors for state s. It is well known from state-preference tfieory that the previous
definitions imply:
E(aj(s)) = L,fjis) = r-i

iJ = A, B)

^

where Kj, and rg are riskless nominal rates of rebim in each country. Exchange rates are
defined as units of A currency per unit of B currency, and we require a rate ^o ^t * c
present time period, and state-dependent exchange rates e(s) at time 1.
Using these simple definitions we can now describe the conditions for pricing of equivalent
state-contingent pure securities in the two countries. We define the magnitude h{s) as,
h{s) = (ffoOflC-s) -

eis)a4(s)).

This magnitude represents the differentia] value, in the two national markets, of a unitary
state s pure security, expressed in A currency terms. Thus, from the viewpoint of an investor in country A, h{s) > 0 would signify an incentive to sell an s state-contingent claim
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in country B and purchase an equivalent claim in country A. On the contrary, h(s) < 0
would prompt a sale of a country A security and an equivalent purchase of a country B
security. Hence, his) furnishes a measure of arbitrage opportunities for equivalent pure
securities traded in the two national markets. It should therefore be clear that the conditions,
his) = 0,

(for all states s)

(3)

are sufficient for perfect integration of the two national capital markets. Condition (3) implies in feet that all pure securities are valued equally in both national markets. This
represents the principle of security price parity (SPP). Thus, perfect integration is that
form of coexistence of the two national markets in which no arbitrage opportunities ever
arise for any pure securities, or their derivatives. Perfect integration can hardly be the outcome of an algebraic accident. It can only be the outcome of perfect mobility of investment
between the two markets which enforces a full set of no-arbitrage conditions, as stated in (3).
Segmentation between the two national markets can now be seen as a form of coexistence
of ihese two markets in which at least one of conditions (3) is violated. If at least one
state-contingent security is not equally priced in the two markets, this must be the outcome
of an impediment to mobility of capital between the two economies. As we already mentioned, such impediments may be due either to institutional factors or to differentiated national preferences of investors, or both. From a more technical standpoint we can see that
segmentation may occur in varying degrees if onJy a few or all of the conditions in (3)
are violated. One classificaiton of segmentation which has analytical usefulness is that between mild and strong segmentation. We define mild segmentation as that form of coexistence of the two national markets in which some conditions in (3) are violated but where
the expected value of price differentials across states of the world is zero. Thus, mild segmentation is defined to occur when
- eis)a^is)] = 2:,[nX^)) = 0 .

••

^^

If we use expressions (1) and (2) to substitute into (4), the condition for mild segmentation
becomes,
eo('"s)"' - £(«i)'"i' - covC^i, a^) = 0 ,

*

(^

Condition (5) represents the value difference between a nominal risk-free asset in country
B and its equivalent (risky) asset in country A. Being a no-arbitrage condition, (5) implies
that a nominal risk-free asset in B and its equivalent asset in A are equally priced in the
two markets from the viewpoint of investors in country A. We refer to this relationship
as uncovered interest rate parity (UIRP) in this model.^ Whenever mild segmentation holds
in this form of UIRP, it should be clear that investors in country A would be indifferent
between issuing (or buying) riskless debt in country B's capital market and issuing (or
buying) an equivalent security in the capital market of country A.*
We define strong segmentation as a form of coexistence of the two national markets such
that the violation of particular conditions in (3) leads to a violation of (4) as well. Thus,
for strong segmentation
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(6)

in accordance with our previous discussion of mild segmentation, it is now seen that if
{( > 0), investors in country A will have an incentive to issue riskless debt denominated
in B currency, whereas if (e < 0), they will conversely have an incentive to purchase riskless
debt denominated in B currency.

X Capita] structure analysis: General conditions
For purposes of further analysis we now suppose that a project located in country B offers
state-contingent payoffe .Y(5) in the currency of its country of location (B). Let us also assume,
at first pass, that the project is owned by investors in country A. Thus, we have international project ownership as a starting condition. The value of this project to its owners
in country A is given by
V^ = J:smsOCAs)aA(s)].

(7a)

The value of the same project to potential investors in country B, given equilibrium prices,
is given hy
(7b)
The owner investors in country A would only retain the project if
AV = eoV" - V* < ( = ) 0 .

(8)

Otherwise, it would be in their best financial interest to sell the project in country B's market
to local investors. It can be noted from (7a and 7b) and from previous definitions that we
can rewrite,
AV=

E[XisMs)].

<9>

On the same logic as for the state-contingent cash fiows of the entire project, we can also
analyze state-contingent cash flows of a i ^ securities issued against such a project, and claiming either a fixed nominal amount (debt) or a residual amount (equity). Thus, if we define
Xji(s) and XE(S) respectively as state-dependent cash flows accruing to debtholders and
shareholders of this project, we can correspondingly state value differentials of debt and
equity as,
AVD = E[XD(s)h(_s)l

(9a)

AVE = E[XEis)Ks)].

(9b)

Naturally, since in any state it must be true that,
X, = Xois) +

344

SB. THOMADAKIS AND N. USMEN

it should also be true that,^
AV = AVp + AKg.
The sufficient conditions for an international capital structure can now be staled unambiguously as,
AVo> 0

-

(lOa)

and
AVE

< 0.

(lOb)

Condition (10b) implies an incentive to retain equity for investors in country A, who value
the shares more highly. Condition (lOa) implies an incentive to issue debt to investors in
country B who, in turn, value the debt securities more highly. The simultaneous validity
of the two conditions produces an international capital structure.*

4. The use of Eurodebt in an intemationa] capital structure
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the additional breadth of capital structure
choices made possible by the availability of Eurodebt securities; in the process the sufficient conditions for the inclusion of Eurodebt in an international capital structure will also
be developed. The analysis is based on a specification of a project located in country B
but owned by investors in country A. The general specification of project cash flows over
the various states is now made specific for the purposes of this and following sections.
Our goal is to demonstrate the efficient^ of Eurodebt utilization with the least possible
complexity.
Let us consider that project cash flows, denominated in country B currency, are specified
as follows:
XH

for

Xl

for s e R'.

J

£ /?

Thus, the project has binary cash flows which can take only two values in B currency.
We assume further that
if

e{r) = minR {e(s)},
I

and
if

e(q) = maxR. {eis)},

the distribution of cash flows over states is such that,
(11)
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The assumption which is stated in (11) simply guarantees that when project cash flows
are translated to A currency by the state-contingent exchange rate, they still maintain their
ordering into the two subsets of states (/?, R'). In other words, all states which are high
cash flow states in B currency will also have cash flows superior to those of the remaining
states when translated into A currency. Figure 1 clarifies the assumed cash flow ordering
in the two currencies.'
It should be clear that this assumption retains the simplest possible form of uncertainty of
cash flows in B currency. It also implies that when translated into A currency by period I
exchange rates the cash flows of the project are highly positively correlated to that exchange
rate. The analytical significance of this feature will be seen immediately below. The analysis
of sufficient conditions and of the feasibility of an international capital structure will be categorized under two different headings, that of mild and that of strong segmentation. As will be
seen, there may arise differences between the two cases, and their comparison can afford
some insight about transition from a strong to a mild segmentation regime. In the remainder
of this section we develop the analysis under the condition of mild segmentation. Mild
segmentation requires that

B-Currency
XH

XL

A-Currency

XLminlet

Figurr I. Project cash flown in the two ciurcncies.
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h(s) > ( < ) 0 for some s
B(h(s)) = 0

•'

(12)

We can now show that the issue of B currency denominated debt in the market of country B will never be preferred by countiy A equity holders. Consider first, default-free
debt of this type, promising a payment Dg such that,

Since such a promised payment can always be honored from project cash flows, we have
XD(S)

= DB

for all s.

If we then calculate differential value of this debt using expression (9), we obtain,
= 0.

(13)

Henee, there is no incentive for country A shareholders to issue any riskless debt in currency B. This is of course an expected result from the assumption of mild segmentation
which implies that UIRP holds.
Consider now risky debt in currency B, with a promised payment Dj, such that
Xi<

DB < Xn.

Such a promised payment can be fully honored in states of high cash flow (set R) but will
default and turn ever to bondholders the project in states of low cash flow (set /?'). It is
assumed that de&ult is a cosUess eventuality. Hence,

Using again expression (9), we obtain:
AVDB = E[XD(SMS)]

= Ds£j,[>i] -(- Xz.fff.[A]

•

where we define
Eff(A] = Efl UMs)

and

£«.[/!] = E^. UMs).

From the condition of mild segmentation where E[h] = 0, it also follows that

(14)
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AVoB = E[XD(.s)h(s)] = (DB - XOEKWS)].

(15)

Observing (15) we note that by construction the quantity (DB - X^) is always positive.
Therefore
AVDB > « ) O

as

Thus, it cannot be excluded that the issue of risky debt in B currency generates positive
differential value. This, however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an ICS.
Noting the sufficiency of two conditions stated in (lOa and 10b), it is further required that
differential value of equity is negative, i.e., that investors in country A prefer to retain
an equity stake rather than sell out to country B investors. Note that now, given project
cash flows and risky debt, we can define equity payments as follows.

Therefore,
AVEB = E[XE(s)h{s)] = (XH - DB)Em-

(16)

Again, it should be noted that, by contruction, (Xf] - D^ > 0, so that
as

Eg[h\

This result clearly excludes the feasibility of an international capital structure. For if £x[/t]
> 0, then both debt and equity will be more highly valued in country B, and country A
owners will have an incentive to sell off the entire project to country B investors. On the
other hand, if EK[K\ < 0, country A owners will have no incentive to issue any debt in
country B's market.
The previous analysis provides full demonstration that, under the given project specification, an ICS which includes equity held in country A and B currency debt held in country
B, cannot be an efficient choice.^ More specifically, riskless debt is excluded by the validity
of UIRF. Risky debt, although not excluded, requires conditions which make equally attractive the sale of equity and the whole project to country B investors as well. Thus, in
the second case, the efficient outcome would be local rather than international ownership
of the project.
We can now examine the possible efficiency of Eurodebt. This is debt issued against
the project to country B investors but denominated in country A currency. Let us first consider default-free Eurodebt with promised payment D^, where
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It is clear that such a promised payment will be honored in every state. It should also be
clear that to investors in country B Eurodebt is not a fixed-income security. Although it
is fixed in currency A, it is state-dependent when translated into currency B at time 1.
Thus, it is not a substitute of B-denominated debt. It is a security which is defeult-free
(since full payment is guaranteed in every state) but whose payment depends on the draw
of the exchange rate.
ID order to discover the value differential for this type of debt, we again note that

and, using (9a),

noting that under mild segmentation £[/i] = 0, and that
E[he-^\

= £[A]£[e-'] + cov[A, e"']

we obtain,
-'].

(17a)

If, thus, the covariation of the factors h(s) with the inverse exchange rate is positive, riskless
Eurodebt will be desirable. However, in order to assess the efficiency of an ICS which
includes such debt, we must also calculate equity differential value. Equity payoffs are,
XE{S) = X{s) -

D^eisrK

Using (9b), we obtain the equity value differential,
D^ cov[h, «"'].

(17b)

The sufficient conditions (10a and 10b) for an international capital structure are capable
of being simultaneously fulfilled by (17a and 17b). Thus,
AVp^ > 0 requires that cov(/i, e~') > 0.

.

AVEA < 0 requires that E^lh] < D^iXn - Xf.)"' co\[h, e " ' ] .
We note that these conditions m ^ be easily fulfilled, as for example in the case where
the ctwariance is positive and E/f[/i] is negative. These parametric requirements are compatible. Hence, there m ^ exist an efficient ICS which includes defeuh-free Eurodebt.
Proceeding to examine the case of risky Eurodebt, we now set D^ a s : ' "
DA<

X^eir).
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The riskiness of Eurodebt in this case arises from the feet that whereas in high cash flow
states, the promised payment is fully honored, in low cash flow states there is defeult, and
the entire project cash flow gets transferred to debtholders. Thus,

Xt^)

D^eisr'

seR

Xg,

seR'.

=

VUuation differentials and sufficient conditions for the efficiency of an intemationa] capital
structure now become,
AVoA = D^E^lhe-'] - XiEjtlh] > 0
AVEA = XfiEitifi] - D^E^ihe-']

< 0.

(18a)
(18b)

These conditions can feasibly hold simultaneously if,

We can now bring together some basic conclusions and insights fix)m the preceding analysis.
Starting from a project which demonstrably cannot support an efficient capital structure
made up of country A equity and country B foreign debt; we have demonstrated two propositions, under the assumption of mild segmentation. One is that an ICS may include country B Eurodebt, i.e., that investors in B may attach higher value to a bond denominated
in A currency, than investors in A. Eurodebt may be feasible as either a default-free or
a riskly claim, depending on several parametric conditions of segmentation and project
characteristics. Therefore, it represents an efficient option in capital structure decisions,
in conditions that exclude the use of foreign debt. Thus, the range of efficient ICS choices
is considerably enlarged when Eurodebt is an available instrument.
The other proposition is that in the simplest case of defeult-free Eurodebt, which is empirically the most common and therefore the most interesting, its efficient inclusion in an
ICS depends on two conditions, as was shown. One of these conditions characterizes the
regime of segmentation itself, and must be commented upon. It requires that unenforceable
arbitrage opportunities [h(s)] should covary positively with inverse exchange rates k(j)"'],
across states of the world. In states where A currency is strong vis-a-vis B currency, there
should also be higher valuation of the corresponding state-contingent securities in country
B. Conversely, in states where B currency is strong vis-a-vis A currency, there should also
be higher valuation in country A. This is a requirement of the regime of segmentation
which is not beyond rational grounds. It may be the case for example Ihat in conditions
of extreme over- or undervaluation of one currency versus the other, security markets fail
to enforce arbitrage opportunities between two countries. This could be the outcome of
either investor reticence at crossing their national frontier with financial investment under
extreme exchange rate deviations, or of a high probability of imposition of capital controls,
in the context of a balance of p^ments crisis associated precisely with these conditions.
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5. Strong segmentation and default-free claims

.^

We now turn to the case of strong segmentation, as was earlier defined by the condition
that some state prices do not align in the two markets so that,''
E[h] = e > 0;
or equivalently that,

'

'

•

£«.[ft] = e > 0.
Strong segmentation, as already mentioned, means that UIRP is violated and that a riskless
asset denominated in B currency is more valuable in country B than its country A equivalent
asset. In the context of our previous analysis, this seems to create a strong presumption
in fevor of issuing defeult-free debt securities denominated in B currency against the project. What we therefore propose to do in this section is to limit the discussion to defaultfree debt securities, since the violation of UIRP creates the strongest incentives for the
issue of these instruments. Furthermore, this is also an appropriate analysis if we suppose
that in a strongly segmented market the issue of debt associated with default risks, across
national boundaries, may be impeded t y explicit costs of information, defeult, or shifts
of ownership from one set of investors to another. In any case, the main task of this section
is to demonstrate that, under specific conditions of the regime of segmentation, defeuitfree Eurodebt will be preferred to defeult-firee foreign debt despite the incentives provided
by the UIRP violation.
Let us first consider defeult-free, B-denominated debt which must o b ^ the limitation

The value differential functions will now be as follows,
DV = XHEM
DVDB

+ Xi^EK-[h] = (Xn - XOEM

= eDg

DVEB = (Xn - XO E^m

+ ^i

(19)
•

+ e(Xi -

DB).

.

(19a)
(I9b)

The incentive to issue defeult-free debt is obvious in (19a) since when (e > 0), any amount
of such debt will lead to a positive value differential. On the other hand, the sufficient
condition for an ICS is a simultaneous fiilfillment of (10b), i.e.,
DVEB

= (Xfi - XO Ej,[h] + e(Xi - D^) < ( = ) 0.

Given the assumed positive value of (e) and the restriction on Dg not to exceed X^, this
condition can only be fiilfilled if,

< 0.

(20)
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In fact, when the maximum advantage is drawn from the issue of defoult-fTee debt, the
promised payment goes to its upper limit (Xi) and (20) along with the positivity of (t)
become the sufficient conditions for an ICS. If (20) does not hold, then it is easy to see
that original country A owners are better off selling the entire project to country B investors, rather than engaging in international financing.
Consider finally, the corresponding analysis with default-free Eurodebt. The restriction
in the promised payment for such debt to be defeult-frec is,

where

Computing once again the value differential functions, we obtain,

tX^ - D^Elhe-'].

(21b)

It is seen from (21a) that a necessary condition for the issuance of de&uh-free Eurodebt
is that,

> 0

(22)

On the other hand, from (21b) the simultaneous fulfillment of (OK£^ < 0) is sufficient
for an ICS. This condition does not simply depend on the parametric makeup of the segmentation regime, but on project characteristics as well. It is now easy to see that if (22) indeed
holds, then the third term in (21b) makes a negative contribution to DV^^; thus if the latter is negative at an arbitrary level of defeiult-free Eurodebt, it will also be negative at the
maximum default-free Eurodebt, i.e., when.

In other words, if an ICS is feasible for an arbitrary level of default-free Eurodebt, it will
then be efficient at the maximum allowable amount of defiiult-free Eurodebt, since this
will generate the largest valuation differential in favor of country A project owners.
Since in both the cases of an efficient ICS with inclusion only of default-free debt, there
are incentives for issuing the maximum amount of such debt, it is now reasonable to summarize the conditions for each type of ICS, at the respective maximal amounts of Bdenominated and A-denominated debt. (Dg = X^ and D^ = e*X[). This is done in table 1.
From the summary of sufficient conditions in table 1, it is easy to see that B-denominated
and A-denominated debt will be mutually exclusive. Clearly, if sufficient conditions hold
for inclusion of one type of debt and not the other in an ICS. then there is no choice. If
both sets of conditions were to be satisfied however, one choice would always be superior
to the other. This relative superiority will depend on whether,
e - e*[he-^] > ( < ) 0.

(23)
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Table 1. Conditions for efiicient ICS with maximal amounts of default-free debt.
Debt Type

Debt Condition

Equity Condition

B-denominated

X^ ( > 0

(X^ - X,^)Eg[h] < 0

A-denominaled

Xt^'EI/w"'] > 0

(X^ - Xi^)Eg[h] + X^ie - ^'ElAf"']} < 0

If the LHS of (23) exceeds zero then the gain from B-denominated debt (foreign debt) will
exceed that from A-denominated debt (Eurodebt), and vice versa. Note that if both conditions for B-denominated debt are fulfilled, but if at the same time the LHS of (23) is negative,
then not only the debt but also the equity condition on Eurodebt will be satisfied a fortiori.
The analysis of the case of strong segmentation suggests therefore that gains are available
from defeult-free debt, as expected, and that this debt will be exclusively of one or the
other type, depending on the maximal prospective gain.

6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, the analysis of corporate financing choices in a regime of segmented international capital markets has focused on the efficiency of inclusion of Eurodebt in an international capital structure (ICS). Several points have been demonstrated. The major one is
that the infeasibility of an ICS with foreign debt does not automatically exclude the feasibility
of an ICS with Eurodebt. Thus, Eurodebt is a financing option which must be evaluated,
even when foreign debt is excluded. Previous analysis had suggested that the most likely
segmentation regime for the efficiency of foreign debt is one in which security price parity
violations across states are only weakly correlated to state-dependent exchange rates. The
present analysis suggests that the likely regime for the efficiency of Eurodebt is one in
which security price parity violations are strongly correlated to exchange rates across states
of the world.
In a regime of strong segmentation where even interest rate parity is violated, there are
strong incentives for default-free debt of one or the other type, depending on the direction
of the violation. When however, we examine a regime of mild segmentation where interest
rate parity holds at least on one side of the market, incentives vanish for default-free foreign
debt but may still be present for the issue of default-free Eurodebt. Hence Eurodebt may
be more in demand as the process of globalization pushes the mode of capital market coexistence from strong to mild type segmentation.
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Notes
1. See. for example. Eminzs and Lo&q (1985). Jorion and Schwartz (1986). Hietala (1989). Gultekin el al.
(1989), Bonser-Neal et al. (1990), Alexander et al. (1988).
2. Empirical studies of international debt issues, few thai they arc, have focused on Eurobonds. Kidwell et al.
(1985) investigated cost savings of U.S. firms which issue Eurodollai bonds. TTieir evidence hints to a degree
of segmcnution in the bond markets. More recently, Kim and Stulz (1988) showed positive average abnormal stock returns to U.S. firms issuing Eurobonds. They argue that the explanation of an ability to issue
Eurobonds at cheaper rates is due to an international clientele effect. Clientele effects arc naturally forms
(rf segmentation.
3. See Thomadakis and Usmen (1991) (pp. 44-45 and footnote 4). An equivalent way of staling (5) would be:

NoCe that this expression differs from the more familiar way of stating UIRP, i.e..

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.

10.

where the risk-aversion parameters are ignored. (5) provides a more precise relationship between the riskfree rates in the two countries.
The choice of country A investors is purely arbitrary. Everything could be restated from the viewpoint of
country B investors as well. Il should be noted however ihat UIRP stated from the viewpoint of one set of
national investors is not equivalent to UIRP slated from the viewpoint of ihc other set. Thus, il is possible
to observe deviations from UIRP in one direction but validity of UIRP in ihe other direction. This occurs
because the risk-free (nominal) assets of the tvre countries are not perfect substitutes. For a full discussion
of this issue see Thomadakis and Usmcn (1990).
Thevalidity of this statement derives fit>m the &ct that with perfect national capital markets, the Modigiiani and
Miller (MM) effect holds in each of these markets, ll therefore also holds for the differentia] vBluations between
the two markets, i.e., if r* = P^ + V^ and if also J* = l ^ + ^f, it follows thai ^V = AVp + AV^.
For complete analysis and discussion of these conditions see Tbomadakis and Usmen (1991), pp. 45-47.
A more complicated cash flow pattern does not reveal much more insight than the present specification.
The crucial point to keep in mind, at this juncture, is that cash flows and exchange rates are highly correlated
from the viewpoint of shareholders, and investors in country A in general.
This finding is in line with a more general result of the Thomadakis and Usmen (1991) analysis, where it
is argued that an ICS requires only weak correlations between X(s) and exchange rates.
It is easy to show that £(A«~'] is the quantity which measures the validity of UIRP concerning a riskless
asset denominated in A currency, whereas we noted that £(/•] was the corresponding quantity for a B currency
riskless asset. It is possible to have £(Ae"'] > 0, while E[h] = 0.
There are many other intermediate levels of risky EurodebC which could have been chosen, since project
cash flows translated into A currency arc not binary. Generally, risky debt can be defined as promising a
payment D^, where.

The sufficient conditions in that case would become:

= (XH - X,)Eg.[k] +

> 0-

However, a niore general analysis is not necessary at this point, since the objective is only to show feasibility
of an international capital structure, i.e., that it will arise under a set of consistent conditions.
11. We choose below a positive violation of UTRP because that creates a pHma facie incentive for debt issues
in country B.
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